Fred Dretske grounds, or reasons, when the question ‘How does S know?’ can sensibly be asked and answered, the evidence, grounds, or reasons must be. Fred Dretske is an epistemologist who proposed in his essay “Conclusive Reasons,” that evidence, grounds, and reasons should be considered as. On Dretske’s view knowing p is roughly a matter of having a reason R for believing p which meets the following condition (‘CR’ for conclusive.
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Still, it is surprising that Dretske cited the red barn case as the basis for preferring his version of tracking over Nozick’s. Indeed, he cited this as a virtue of his conclusive reasons view. Arguably, for justification closure, all that is necessary is that when, given all of our relevant evidence ewe are justified in believing pwe also have sufficient justification for believing each of p ‘s consequences.
For example, since not – biv is entailed by hI am in San Antonio, skeptics may argue as follows:. To see why, notice that if the chances of winning a lottery are sufficiently remote, I am justified in believing that my ticket, deetske 1, will lose. Hawthorne raises the possibility that, in the course of grasping that p entails qS will cease to know p.
Request removal from index. The probability of this conjunctive proposition is less than the probability of either of its conjuncts. Externalist theorists reject the assumption, saying that M can generate knowledge when used in circumstances under which the belief it yields is not accidentally correct. To explain the truth of a and bDretske counted on his conclusive reasons analysis of perception.
Having rejected Kand denying that we know things like not-muleNozick also had to deny closure across simplification.
As Dretske acknowledgedit is actually a weak challenge to K since some relevant alternatives accounts are fully consistent with K. If not-mule were false, you would still have zebra-in-a-cage visual percepts and you would still believe zeband you would still believe not-mule by deducing it from zeb. According to Dretske and Nozick, we can account for the appeal of skepticism and explain where it goes wrong if we accept their view of knowledge and reject K.
Subjective and Objective Reasons in Philosophy of Action. He thought we can know banal facts e.
The arguments against closure include the following:. Consider the following principles:. SI requires that reqsons be true in the nearby R worlds. What matters is whether the various modes of knowledge Dretske discusses position us to know the consequences of the things we know. The actual world is one’s situation as it is when one arrives at the belief p. If I were, I would justifiably believe that no ticket will win. What do you know? Do you know not-mule?
Fred I. Dretske, Conclusive reasons – PhilPapers
Instead, it might be p itself, which is, after all, a justified belief. Why say SI underwrites K? According to Nozick, to know p is, very roughly and ignoring his thoroughly discredited fourth condition for knowledge, criticized, e. If R held, p would be true i. The Argument From Skepticism 5.
We cannot defend closure by denying that we know any mundane proposition that entails a dretwke proposition since it is clear that we know that many things are true that entail lotteryesque propositions.
Moorethat closure itself is a firm datum—it is obvious enough to rule out any understanding of knowledge or related notions that undermines closure. In rough outline, the first version involves defending say Dretske’s or Nozick’s tracking analysis of knowledge, then showing that it undermines K versions of the tracking account are also defended by Beckerconclusiive Murphy and Blackand by Roushthe last of whom modifies the tracking account so as to preserve closure; for criticisms of Rouse see Brueckner Some final observations can be made using Roderick Firth’s distinction between propositional and doxastic justification.
Since knowledge entails belief according to nearly all theoristswe fail to know q. Reasons and Rationality in Philosophy of Action. After all, I might win the lottery.
Contemporary Perspectives on SkepticismM. R indicates p iff p would be true if R held.
The Argument From the Analysis of Knowledge The argument from the analysis of knowledge says that the correct account of knowledge leads to K failure.
If, while justifiably believing various propositions, S believes p because S knows that they entail pthen S justifiably believes p. Information, Dretske claimed, can causally sustain beliefalthough he asked himself “How can an abstract commodity like information be causally efficacious”. Different versions of the safety condition have been defended; see, for example, Luper ; Sosa,; Williamson ; and Pritchard So you do reaaons know not-mule.